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ISSUES IN WATER PLANNING FOR UTAH 1I 
by Jay C. Andersen 1! 
Utah is at the crossroads in water resources planning. Qua"lity 
of water, transfers in uses interbasin transfers, and use of our en t itle-
ment in the Colorado River are among the important issues. Ut ah is in 
a position to exercise some control of water use policies and is doing 
so. In this short presentation, we can only call attention to some 
issues where things may not always seem clear at first glance . Hopefully 
some thoughts can be presented to stimulate appropriate courses of action. 
In economics we often refer to the fallacy of composition. What 
is the II fallacy of composition"? The fallacy is, "What is true for the 
individual or part is necessarily also true for the group or whole. " 
Issue: Increased water supply to a farmer increases production so that 
he rea 1 i zes a qumper crop. The fa rmer lsi ncome is 1 a rger than formerly 
Therefore, if water supply is increased to all farmers, they will be 
better off. This applies to farmers as a group .. 
Wrong . Because price declines as total output goes up, and as 
all farmers realize bumper crops, price is depressed. If price declines 
overbalance the large output, farm incomes fall. Whether to t al income 
rises or falls depends upon the price elasticity of demand for the 
products; that is, the coefficient of change in relative quantity as 
11 Paper presented at Blue Ribbon Committee on Water Planning of 
the Utah State Legislature, Ap r il 18, 1978. 
~I Professor and Head, Department of Economics, Utah State Univer-
sity, Logan, Utah 84322. 
as compared to the relative change in price. For most agricultural 
products, the demand is inelastic so that price varies relatively more 
than quantity. Thus, as quantity is increased, price is forced down 
relatively more so that total income to farmers falls. 
That's an easy example. It's plain to see the fallacy of 
extending the finding beyond its logical limits. In economics the 
difference between the individual and the aggregate is distinguished 
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as micro-economics and macro-economics. Let's turn to some examples that 
are less obvious. In water supply analysis, a systems approach provides 
the macro view that avoids the fallacy of composition. 
Issue: Improvements in irrigation efficiency lead to increases in welfare. 
Not necessarily. Begin with the concept of irrigation efficiency. 
Its definition is the ratio of the amount of water consumptively used in 
evapotranspiration of plants to the amount of water diverted . Thus, the 
higher the proportion of the diversion actually used up, the more efficient 
the system. The problem arises in the distinction of the incentive system 
at the micro (farm) level and the results in a basin-wide context. Individual 
proprietors seek to increase their efficiency because their water right is 
often defined in terms of the amount that they are authorized to divert 
from the canal or stream. They see the opportunity to (1) distribute water 
more evenly and increase yields, and (2) irrigate more acres with a better 
water supply because of careful husbandry. They may do this by sprinkling, 
improving canals and ditches, leveling the land, or simply applying more 
intensive labor and management to the irrigation process. As might be 
expected, a smaller proportion of water diverted from streams and canals 
returns to the downstream water flow. 
In the Sevier River Basin in Utah, which is a closed asin, many 
have said that the flow of the river is entirely diverted seven .times. 
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The accuracy of this statement cannot be attested, but it seems to be 
approximately true. In the Sevier Basin when upstream users adopt improved 
irrigation practices and irrigate more acres with a full-season supply, the 
water suply to the lower basin becomes lessened. This happens despite a 
court decree that allocates portions of the flow to upper and lower basin 
users. Whether overall welfare is increased or decreased d?pends on 
the relative values of the upstream and downstream uses and the cost of 
the improvements. As a certainty there arises an equity problem. Legal 
actions have become commonplace in the Sevier Basin. 
It is a problem. Farmers who want to improve irrigation say that 
irrigation water rights are property rights. They claim they can do as 
they please with these rights. They stress that not being able to expand 
acreage reduces incentive to conserve water and become efficient. 
But, what of the downstream user who also has a paten t ed water 
right and a long-standing use of water coming from the upstream return 
flows? Is the water right less valid? Only the courts can decide this 
equity issue. It is clear that any analysis of this water supply bearing 
on the economic efficiency and equity of the situation must depend on an 
overall system evaluation. 
It is a commonly- held notion that substantial water 'Isavings" can 
be achieved through more effic.ient water use and that the unneeded Ilexcessil 
could then be released back into the system to meet other demands. While 
this may be possible in certain situations, there are some serious flaws 
in much of the simplistic thinking on the subject. 
Careless application of efficiency criterion has led to misconceptions 
fostering unrealistic and counterproductive policy recommendations. For 
example, one commonly hears statements such as: lIif seepage from canals 
and laterals could be reduced through improved conveyance efficiency, many 
acre feet of new water could be made available;" or, "if irrigation 
efficiency could be increased just 5 percent, we would have enough 
water to supply all our anticipated municipal and industrial needs." 
Such statements are generally erroneous extrapolations of part icular or 
point efficiency measurements which ignore the hydrologic uni ty of river 
basin water systems. Changing such efficiencies can alter the routing, 
gua1ity, or timing of flow to downstream points; but they generally 
have no substantial effect on the basin water supply volume. Whether 
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changes in regimen or quality prove to be advantageous or disadvantageous 
depends on the peculiar physiographic and demographic situation of the 
river system. 
When people talk about adopting practices that save water, the 
under-lying concern is really to extend the utility of a supply to 
accomodate additional needs of a wide variety of legitimate uses. Yet 
they often fail to consider the fact that utility (which invol ves economic, 
quality, institutional, and legal dimensions, as well as physical) cannot 
be measured by physical efficiency indices alone. Efficiency terms permit 
comparisons of practice but not comparisons of utility viewed in river 
basin perspective. Recommendations regarding transfer of water rights, 
water pricing, recognition of social and economic values and externalities, 
and incentive programs often exhibit a gross misconception of the public 
impact of improved efficiencies. 
Issue: Each of a group of farmers sell one-fourth of their direct flow 
water rights for use in an energy development so that we expect a decline 
in agricultural production. 
Not necessarily. In one case where this has happened, the power 
company paid farmers perhaps 10 times the agricultural value for a portion 
of the water right sold and has built a dam to store and regulate the flow 
of the river. This has provided for a season-long availability of water. 
Lined canals and other conveyances have been built to improve the 
conveyance efficiency of the delivery system so that a greater proportion 
of the water is actually delivered. In summary, the water supply the 
farmers have is more secure and in greater quantity, especially in 
the late part of the year, than was formerly the case. A cursory pre-
evaluation could have led to erroneous conclusions. 
In most of Utah, flexibilities exist on maintaining agriculture 
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in addition to uses of water for power plant cooling. Numerous possibilities 
are usually available to use water more carefully by lining canals, 
building storage reservoirs, application of water by sprinkling, and so 
forth, to make the water extend to most, if not all of the area irrigated 
before a power plant is located. Probably the one major area in Utah 
where only very expensive alternatives exist to maintain agriculture with 
a power plant is in the Lower Sevier River Basin. Interestingly enough, 
this is the IPP proposed site as a back-up or alternate site to the much-
criticized Salt Wash location in Kane County. 
The Lynndyl site is at the lower end of the river system. The 
Sevier River is thoroughly and efficiently used. There is no alternative 
way (excepting a long and expensive interbasin transfer) to avoid directly 
taking land from agricultural production to obtain water for the plant. 
Careful evaluation of this alternative should be made before accepting 
the location. Clearly, water cost and availability is not t he major 
factor in power plant siting. However, impacts on other water users can 
be critical. As evidence of the small concern with costs in energy 
development, the following table illustrates the minor energy production 
cost increases associated with a very large increase in watel~ costs: 
Table 1. Increase in Costs of Production for Energy Products 
Water Use 
Coal Gasification 
Coal Liquefaction 
Coal Fired Electical Generation 
Shale Oil 
Coal Pipelines 
Coa 1 t~i ni ng 
Cost Increases for a $200 per acre 
Feet Increase in Price of Water 
2%-8% 
1%-6% 
1%-2% 
0.6%-1 % 
2%-3% 
0% 
Source: Andersen, J. C. and J. E. Keith IIEnergy and the Colorado 
River ll Natural Resources Journal 17(2):157-168. April 1977. 
6 
Clearly, if the people of Utah desire a voice in the water-use 
policy decisions, they must exercise some polictical controls. Commercial, 
environmental, and national forces are apt to ignore the question of 
alternative uses for water to concentrate on air, fuel availability and 
other factors. 
Issue: For energy projects it is proposed to adopt a IItotal containment" 
po 1 icy for wa ter diverted to prevent the sa 1 ty wa ter from returni ng to the 
river in order to insure a higher quality water in the lower r eaches of the 
river. 
It may not work. There are two parts to the quality problem. The 
measurement may be salt load, which is the total quantity of salt flowing 
down the river in a dissolved state. Or, the measurement may be concentra-
tion, which indicates the proportion of salt to a given amount of water. 
Each of these may be important depending on the particular concern i n 
the downstream area. 
In a river modeling study of the Colorado River, the results 
suggest that as energy development with total containment proceeds 
through time, the total tons of salt load would decrease relative to the 
base situation. Compare lines 1 and 3 in Table 2. As can be seen in 
this table, the salt load would be decidedly higher with medium rather 
than the higher energy utilization level which would lead to greater 
flows. The salt load would be small under high utilization and the 
consequent low flow. 
At the same time, salt concentration in the river would rise 
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with accelerated energy development. The conclusion is that an inc reased 
rate of energy development would result in an increase in concentration 
at Imperial Dam. This effect is due to the reduced flows of water for 
dilution particularly due to the anticipated total containment technology. 
A situation which seems to escape some concerned parties is that water 
returned from once-through cooling in the upper basin is likely of better 
quality than the quality of water flowing in the lower basin. 
Table 2. Predicted Salinity Effects at Iltlpe l" ial Da m of Alte 'r'native Future 
Uses in the Colorado River Basin 
Assumed Flow Salt Load Salt 
Million Acre (Million Concentration 
Fee t/Year Utilization Level ton/yea r) (mg /1 ) 
Ag r i c. Energy Ex port 1977 1983 1990- 1977 1983 1990-
2000 2000 
14 Medium Medium r~ed i um 916 912 784 828 922 1090 
14 High Medium ~1edi urn 927 920 790 844 956 1162 
14 Medium High Medium 916 905 755 828 928 1142 
14 M.edium r~ed i urn High 872 875 780 839 937 1097 
So urce: Bisho p, A. B., J. C. Andersen , et. a 1 . "Colorado River Region al 
Assessment Study," Prepared for Nationa l Commissioll on Water 
Quality, Utah Water Research Laboratory , Uta h State Un iversity 
Logan, Utah. Part 1, pp. 156-158 , 
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It appears that energy may have significant impacts on loca l and 
regional water allocations and quality. Upon whom the impacts fall will 
depend to a great extent on institutional and economic constraints and 
incentives which are imposed, either as a result of historical deve opment 
or future policy directions. It is not so clear that energy development 
will be a detriment to either upstream or downstream users of the Colorado 
River. 
Investigations of the problem have lacked depth and a broad 
systems perspective in many cases. The case of the total con ~ ainment 
technology being represented to solve salinity problems is an examp l e. 
If only one side (in this case the salt load) is considered, the answer 
to the problem may be different than if other factors are brought to bear, 
such as having water for dilution and the extra costs incurred. A strong 
objective look at the social, economic, and physical problem5 is suggested. 
Some consideration might be given by Upper Basin states to attempt 
to have water quality standards defined in terms of total to~s of dissolved 
salts flowing in the stream. Recent experience at EPA in Washington 
suggests at least a possibility of defining pollution regulations in that 
way. Under those circumstances, any diversion taking water completely 
out of the river, such as the Central Utah Project and totally contained 
energy projects, also take out some amount of salts. The ad'/antage to 
accounting for salt load rather than parts per million is that water 
taken out is high quality and would serve as a dilutant on the ppm 
standard as the water moves downstream where quality is poorer. Removing 
of even high quality water also removes some of the salt load. Thus, it 
may be fairly easy for an upstream state to reduce the salt i oading in the 
Colorado River. The continuous process of distilling out the high quality 
water makes it difficult to control the concentration. 
______________________________________________________________ ...... 1_ 1 .... .0 .............. .. 
Issue: A closed groundwater basin that is recelvlng no recha r ge should 
be most sparingly and carefully used to extend its life. 
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But, what about present value concepts in which any positive rate 
of discount of the future makes income in the near term more valuable 
than the same amount in the distant future? A closed groundwater basin 
is essentially a mine. Following Anthony Scott ~ the theory of the 
mine can be represented as in Figure 1. 
In this case, the value of the resource is not the same for 
every unit extracted as it is for most minerals. There is declining 
marginal productivity. Notice that either too rapid or two slow rate 
of resource withdrawal is inefficient as defined by the difference between 
total revenue and total cost or the profit curve. 
In Figure 1, A is the rate of maximum current profit per 
acre foot of water and B indicates the maximum profit per irrigation 
season. These two rates define the range of relevant values. Now, 
what is the optimum? Clearly, if those who control the water have 
only one more year or season after which they can withdraw no more 
water, then the appropriate rate is B, the maximum profit of the year. 
If there is no discount on future income and if the amount of the reserves 
and present and future costs and prices are all known, then profit per 
acre foot should be maximized at A. But, to maximize the present value 
of the resource, future profits must be discounted. Any rate of interest 
above zero induces owners of the water to shorten the life of the ground-
water mine. Thus, operators increase the rate of extraction toward B, 
the maximum rate of profit per season. 
Let us now introduce the concept of user cost. In Fi gure 2, we 
have UC and UC'. UC' is at a higher rate of discount than UC. User cost 
- 3/ 
- Scott, Anthony T. 1970. The theory of the mine under conditions 
of certainty. In: Mason Gaffney (ed) Extractive Resources and Taxation. 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
, \ 
1?I,t 
Figure 1. The Theory of the t~ ine Relating Various Economic Variables 
to Rate of Extraction 
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Figure 2 The Effect of a Change i n Discount Rate on User Cost and the 
Optimal Rate of Extraction 
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is defined as the present value of profits foregone by a decision to use 
a unit of water today. Note that with a higher discount rate, less future 
profit is foregone by using the resource today. Thus, as rate of discount 
is increased, the optimal rate of extraction increases from C to D. In 
each case this represents the maximum difference between the profit 
curve and user cost. Thus, the wa ter users a re not mati va ted toward 
maximum conservation. In this case, like others, high interest rates 
(discounts on the future) discourage conservation and preservation. 
Issue: A drought 'comes where a city has first rights to the surface 
water. Downstream irrigators can have what's left over. Put a brick 
in the toilet, shower with a friend, and save water. We must conserve. 
That's the usual compaign. But let's look at it. In the city of 
Logan, Utah, and several others in the Mountain West and elsewhere, the 
city water comes from surface flows and flows downhill to the city. The 
water that goes to the city is used both inside and outside the house. 
Water that stays in the pipes (inside use) goes back through the sewer 
and treatment facilities and is returned to the river. There is no 
evidence that water is lost by going through toilets, showers, tubs, and 
sinks. Of course, water consumptively used in lawns and gardens does not 
return to be used for irrigators. Credibility has been lost by well-
meaning people campaigning for conservation inside. Most thinking people 
see through the shallowness of such arguments. Better not cry wolf when 
there is no danger. We see again that conservation by saving is re l evant 
only for stock-type resources. Purely flow resources cannot be saved. 
Issue: Water for irrigation is worth about the same wherever . it is used 
in Utah, so it doesn't matter where it is applied. 
It is probably true that many visualize the value of water as 
being rather low when us~d for irrigation. Some areas that are relatively 
short on water have high values for additional increments of water; others 
have low values. The followi ng table gives approximate values. These 
may be a useful guide for allocating water. Of course, cost of delivery 
is also important. 
Table 3. Quantity of Water Used for Irrigation and Value of Marginal 
Product by Region in Utah at Present Level of Use. 
Quantity of Water Value of Marginal Product 
Region Diverted Consumed Diverted Consumed 
Great Salt Lake Desert 105 50 8.20 14.00 
Bear River 623 212 3.40 9.80 
Weber 610 224 1 .54 4.19 
Jordan 713 278 2.85 7.45 
Sevier 870 282 7.33 22.58 
Cedar--Beaver 136 61 11 .28 26.00 
Uintah 789 293 1 .95 5.26 
West Colorado 303 113 3.62 9.66 
Southeast Colorado 146 29 1 .81 9.10 
Lower Colorado 68 34 9.42 18.81 
TOTAL 4,363 1 ,576 
Issue: 
Sevier 
Most studies indicate that the value of water in basins like the 
and Colorado is highest in downstream areas where climate is 
milder and selection of crops and yields are greater. 
That mayor may not be true. In an earlier piece of researchil 
we divided the Sevier Basin into four parts from Area I upstream, to 
Area 4 downstream. Considering physical basin characteristics, return 
13 
~/Hiskey, Harold H .. Jay C. Andersen, and David L. Wilson, Some 
upstream-downstream conflicts in water rights transfers. Paper presented 
at joint meetings of American Agricultural Economics Association, Western 
Agrricultural Economics Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, August 10-12. 
1973. 
- -- - ---~-. -------- - ---_.------_. 
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flows from the southern and eastern parts of Area I can be diverted 
again in that area, near Circleville and Kingston, then twice more in 
Area II, and once in Area IV. Return flows from diversions in Area III 
can be diverted in area II once and once in Area IV. Thus, using the ' 
constant consumptive use values of water found previously for each area, 
values per acre foot at point of first diversion can be estimated by 
multiplying the area use efficiency factor times the proportion of the 
acre foot of transfer diverted times the value of consumptive use water 
for the area, and are computed as follows: 
Area I = 28 X 100 ($16) + 28 X 72 ($16) + 38 X 52 ($22) 
+ 38 X 32 ($22) + 45 X 20 ($23) = 16.81 
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Area II = 38 X 100 ($22) + 38 X 62 ($22) + 45 X 38 ($23) = 17.47 
Area III = 38 X 100 ($13) + 38 X 62 ($22) + 45 X 38 ($23) = 14.05 
Area IV = 45 X 100 ($23) = 10.35 
Note that the physical use efficiency was estimated to be 38, 38, and 45 
percent for Areas I to IV respectively. Also the value of an incremental 
acre foot of water consumed is $16, $22, $13, and $23 per acre foot for 
each area. 
The values of water obtained from this analysis would suggest that 
for maximizing economic efficiency of use, consumptive use of water should 
be transferred from Area IV back up the river. Water that is consumptively 
used by irrigation in Area I has the complementary effect of the precipi-
tation which falls on the irrigated land. It seems clear that in this 
basin as well as many others, the precipitation is greater and the water 
demands to mature crop are less in the upper, higher elevation parts 
of the basin than in lower basin areas. In this study, the values for 
water take into account this complementary value from precipitation. 
However, we are not sure what values arise when water is transferred 
I, 
because the water in the new area may be placed on already partially 
irrigated land or on present dry land. Furthermore, the value of the 
dry crop or grazing when water is removed is not well known. All that 
we are quite sure of is that the complementary relationship is stronger 
upstream. And, we find that if the water is diverted first in Area I, 
then about 90 percent arising there can be consumptively used throughout 
the system. If water available in Areas II and III is first diverted 
in those areas, then about 79 percent of water can be eventually used. 
If the first diversion is in Area IV, then only 45 percent is used in 
the system;and the remainder escapes. 
Much the same kind of analysis could be applied to tne Colorado 
Basin. Clearly the return flows are great in the upper basin and rare 
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or non-existent in the lower basin. Much of the argument on higher value 
Lower Colorado uses could be defused with this kind of argument. 
Issue: Farmers receive an immense subsidy from federal irrigation water 
developlileflt projects. Society should recapture this winafall and 
glve it to all the people. 
This is a widely-held misconception that underlies the proposed 
rules on the 160-acre limitation regulations. The facts are that we need 
to consider that farmers as a group suffer when more producers come into 
production. The government calculates water rates on the ba~;is of liability 
to pay.1I There is no contention that the irrigation purpose in reclamation 
projects is profitable directly. Perhaps it would be more appropriate 
if it were so, but it is not. No farmer or group of farmers would under-
take water development at usual costs of federal projects. They could 
not begin to pay this full price. The subsidy is ultimately to consumers 
who receive a wider variety of food items at a cheaper price . Costs for 
irrigation are usually offset by power reserves. 
." ._wma: U J . - 2! . £ J. .g ..;. ' • , II t.&" 
, \ 
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The object of concern is that federal projects built many years 
ago continue to sell water at a low price. Some feel this is unfair. 
But, what if we had not had inflation? No one back then could see the 
great technological advances that made it so eff icient to dea l with large 
acreages. In any case, the current land holders are usually not the 
original owners. In most cases, if water is priced low, this has been 
capitalized into higher prices for land. So, current owners acting in 
good faith on the behavior of the Bureau of Reclamation in not enforcing 
the acreage for many years have paid the full price. 
It is now much too late to extract any alleged windfalls. Consumers 
and landowners would be dealt a great injustice if the situation were rolled 
back to the primitive conditions implied by the 1902 law that was based 
on the homestead provisions. Things are not like that any more. 
Issue: Power costs for irrigation pumping are becoming so hLgh tha~ 
operators may be forced out of business. 
This is a valid concern. We are doing a study of irrigation water 
costs. Surface irrigation water is often provided for $1, $1.75, or even 
$3 per acre. These costs are quite reasonable. On the farm that I own, 
the cost is $6 per share in West Cache Irrigation Company. This is 
somewhat higher. In our case, a share is about enough for an acre. 
Our study of energy . costs for pumping in major irrigation pump 
areas indicates the following energy costs for pumping each acre foot of 
water: 
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Table 4. Energy Costs for Pumping Each Acre Foot of Water 
Area 
Pa rowan Beryl-Enterprise 
1975 1976 1975 1976 
Highest Cost $20.51 $19.17 $ 25.90 $ 17.79 
Power Source Power Source 
(1 ) (2) (1 ) (2) 
Average Cost 7.45 9.35 4.09 6.93 4.05 9.53 
Lowest Cost 1 .96 1 .87 1 .69 1 .56 
Of course, there are many other costs of pumping. In terms of 
the values of water noted earlier, it is apparent that some operators are 
unable to pay for water at the price it is costing them. As energy costs 
may continue upward, more serious problems confront us. 
Perhaps we have tried to cover too many issues in this session. 
You may wish to probe deeper into some of them. We in the Economics 
Department at Utah State University welcome an opportunity to be of 
service by helping provide information to the policy-making process. We 
contend that many problems require a systematic look at many problem 
facets beyond the superficial level. 
